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The Navy's Surface Opportune Lift (OPLIFT) program is a
Navy Material Transportation Office-managed cost reduction
program. The program makes use of deploying and returning
U.S. Navy ships to move fleet and shore material. The
transportation cost avoided or saved would otherwise be
billed to Servicewide Transportation funds.
This thesis is an analysis of the OPLIFT program with an
emphasis on the cost savings achieved over the past five
years. In order to deteirmine if maximum cost savings are
being achieved an examination of top management emphasis on
OPLIFT utilization, fleet implementation of the Program and
the existing cost savings reporting system is conducted. In
addition, trends and patterns in OPLIFT utilization are
identified and a multiple regression model to predict
monthly cost savings is developed. An attempt is made to
identify measures which can be taken to upgrade and improve
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I. INTRODUCTION
A large share of the Department of Defense logistics
budget is devoted to transportation services. In fiscal
year (FY) 1986, the Navy's transportation budget, known as
Servicewide Transportation (SWT) , approached $375 million.
Of this amount, over $47.5 million was spent on the ocean
transportation of Navy cargo [Ref . 1] . In the current
atmosphere of close scrutiny of defense spending at all
levels, it is imperative the Navy realize all opportunities
to reduce transportation funding requirements.
Surface Opportune Lift (OPLIFT) is a Navy Material
Transportation Office (NAVMTO) Norfolk managed cost
avoidance program. The program makes use of deploying and
returning U.S. Navy ships to move fleet and shore material.
The material is diverted from the Defense Transportation
System (DTS) to U.S. Navy vessels for movement to fleet
units and shore activities. The transportation costs
avoided would have otherwise been billed to SWT funds.
A viable OPLIFT program can be an effective means of
realizing substantial transportation cost avoidances.
Within the Department of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) has been one of the biggest supporters of
the OPLIFT program. In a message to the Fleet Commanders
(CINCS) in 1982, the CNO's commitment to the program was
conveyed in the fourth paragraph:
Through effective communication and liaison between
Fleet CINCS, supply activities, ships and OPLIFT points of
contact, the Navy can improve performance of the OPLIFT
program and further reduce the expenditure of SWT funds.
Full support in this effort is solicited and any
suggestions which will enhance the OPLIFT of cargo are
welcome. [Ref. 2]
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this research effort are:
1. Determine whether the Navy is currently placing




Review OPLIFT implementation at the fleet level to
ascertain if viable programs are in place;
3 Examine OPLIFT relative to the frequency of
utilization, quantity of tonnage moved, transportation
cost savings achieved, types of cargo moved,
categories of ships moving the cargo and traffic
routes over which the cargo is transported to
determine program trends and patterns.
4 Review the current transportation cost avoidance
reporting system to determine whether it provides a
meaningful picture of Program performance; and
5. Develop a model that can predict monthly OPLIFT cost
avoidances.
B. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Some of the information presented in this study is
pertinent to the OPLIFT of all categories of cargo but due
to the limited availability of data on the movement of
personal material, this study will focus on examining the
cost avoidance implications of transporting Navy sponsored
fleet freight and general OPLIFT cargo only. In the context
of this study "fleet freight" refers to cargo destined for
mobile fleet units that is issued by supply sources in and
around port areas. The term "general OPLIFT cargo" refers
to non-fleet freight cargo (usually heavy, bulky and low
priority shipments with no specific required delivery date)
originating outside a port area for shipment to shore
activities. The analysis of cost avoidances provided to the
Fleet CINCS for moving fleet organic cargo (items in the
custody or plant account records of field activities or
afloat units) and to service members for the movement of
their personal property is beyond the scope of this study.
For the purpose of this study the term "cost avoidance"
is defined to mean a realized reduction in funds which were
otherwise firmly committed by the Navy for transportation
services and is synonymous to the term "cost savings." The
terms "cost avoidance" and "cost savings" will be used
interchangeably
.
In this study cost savings compiled from NAVMTO records
will be referred to as "transportation cost savings
attributed to OPLIFT" and will include first destination
transportation (FDT) , second destination transportation
(SDT) and other (all cost savings other than FDT and SDT
which are distinguished by the Transportation Account Code)
cost savings.
It is assumed that the reader of this study has a
passing familiarity with the DTS and Navy material
transportation procedures.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study included
a literature search through the Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange, the Defense Technical Information
Center and a review of various journals and periodicals
which revealed that prior research on the subject is
nonexistent.
A series of fact finding trips were made to various
activities, including Commander, Naval Supply Systems
Command, Navy Material Transportation Office Norfolk,
Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Commander Naval
Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
A series of telephone interviews was conducted with
management and supervisory personnel assigned to the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander in Chief U.S.
Pacific Fleet, Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific
Fleet, Commander Military Seal ift Command, Naval Supply
Center Norfolk and USNS SIRIUS (T-AFS-8)
.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
Instructions, point papers, reports, cost savings,
tonnage data and correspondence were obtained during the
fact finding trips. Historical files containing information
pertinent to OPLIFT were reviewed at several activities.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II, an "Overview of the Surface Opportune Lift
Program," provides the reader with a general perspective of
the OPLIFT program, how it operates and what direction it is
taking and discusses problems with the current cost savings
reporting system. Chapter III focuses on the implementation
of OPLIFT in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and compares
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each program.
Chapter IV examines the OPLIFT program and identifies the
patterns and trends relative to fleet use, types of cargo
moved, categories of ships moving the cargo and traffic
routes covered. Chapter V develops a model to predict
monthly OPLIFT cost savings. Chapter VI presents the
study's principal findings, conclusions and recommendations.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SURFACE OPPORTUNE LIFT PROGRAM
A. PROGRAM ORIGIN
The U.S. Navy's surface OPLIFT program is believed to
have had its beginning during the Vietnam conflict.
Military vehicles, primarily jeeps and trucks consigned to
the Marine Corps, were becoming increasingly backlogged at
West Coast supply centers and water terminals. Due to the
low transportation priority assigned, the probability of
dissolving the vehicle backlog was small. To counteract the
backlog Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) ships (now
known as Combat Logistics Support Force (CLSF) ) , under the
operational control of Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
(CINCPAC) , began loading and transporting the vehicles to
the Vietnam theater. This continued to occur as long as
available deck space allowed. [Ref. 3]
The effort soon expanded to include all categories of
spare parts, equipment and supplies. There were, however,
three conditions which had to be met before cargo could be
moved by OPLIFT:
1. Excess space had to be available on the carrying
vessel
;
2. The cargo had to be low priority without a specified
delivery date; and
3. The movement of cargo could not adversely affect
operational commitments of the carrying vessel or
require operating schedule changes.
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B. OPPORTUNE LIFT AS A COST SAVINGS TOOL
The need to reduce transportation backlogs during a
period of conflict had given OPLIFT its initial impetus.
The potential cost savings that could be realized through
its use was not the driving force behind OPLIFT 's origin.
With the end of the Vietnam conflict, however, a different
view of defense spending began to develop. In FY 1974
approximately 40 million short tons of DOD cargo were moved
at an estimated cost of $3.5 billion. This amount paid for
only transportation services and did not include DOD's large
capital investments in transportation hardware and
facilities [Ref. 4:p. 2]. Transportation was obviously a
large share of the DOD logistics budget. Vice Admiral
Thomas R. Weschler, then director for logistics, Organiza-
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the mood of the
times when he wrote in 1975 that:
Only by cutting dollars in our support and logistics area
will we have sufficient dollars to procure and support the
B-1 or Trident or other such systems that are so very
vital to keeping the peace. [Ref. 5: p. 5]
Spiraling inflation and the lingering effects of the
1973 oil embargo resulted in rising transportation costs.
In the fall of 1975 a transportation cost analysis conducted
by the Navy projected a large probable deficit of $48 to $50
million for the FY 1976 transportation budget account (now
known as SWT) . Having no prospect for additional funds, the
only alternative left to the Navy was to substantially
reduce transportation costs through movement and mode
restrictions. In January 1976 the CNO issued a Navy-wide
directive (NAVOP 012/76) which imposed controls on
transportation costs. Twenty transportation cost cutting
provisions were implemented. Their implementation resulted
in savings that more than offset the deficit. These
provisions have remained intact and have continued to reduce
transportation costs by an average of $60 million annually.
[Ref. 6]
One of the cost cutting provisions called for Fleet
CINCS to insure that deploying and returning U.S. Navy
ships, including those Military Sealift Command (MSC)
vessels under their operational control, offer OPLIFT for
use by Navy shipping activities. It was envisioned that
increased emphasis on the use of OPLIFT would reduce the
transportation costs paid to commercial ocean carriers and
thereby generate additional transportation funds for support
of other requirements.
In response to the CNO's directive, Fleet CINCS formally
implemented OPLIFT programs. Given little implementing
guidance, the CINCS tailored OPLIFT toward the needs of
their particular fleet. Arranging for and coordinating the
movement of cargo via OPLIFT was, however, a collateral duty
at every level of the program. This "volunteer" nature of
the program, the absence of centralized reporting require-
ments and the limited implementing guidance resulted in a
program that waxed and waned considerably. [Ref. 3]
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OPLIFT cost savings data collection procedures were
relatively undefined and the little data that was available
indicated a decline in the real growth in reported savings
attributed to the program for the period 1978 to 1982.
[Ref. 2]
C. PROGRAM REVITALIZATION
The implications of declining OPLIFT cost savings were
exacerbated by an increased scrutiny of defense spending and
a FY 1982 SWT budget approaching $500 million. The CNO
responded to these events by requesting the assistance of
his Fleet CINCS in ensuring that OPLIFT was aggressively
pursued through the chain of command. In September 1982,
CNO policy guidance on OPLIFT was promulgated. A definition
of OPLIFT and a priority system for allocating OPLIFT space
were provided. In addition, an OPLIFT Program Manager,
NAVMTO Norfolk, was designated. It was hoped that through
more effective communication, liaison, and management
greater cost savings could be realized.
1. Opportune Lift Defined
The CNO defined OPLIFT as follows:
OPLIFT is the movement of cargo aboard U.S. Navy ships
between the continental United States [CONUS] and overseas
areas or between overseas areas (intratheater) . OPLIFT
cargo is non-organic to the carrying ships and is cargo
whose transportation would, in the absence of OPLIFT
space, otherwise be billed to an appropriation charging
SWT funds. Only cargo consigned to mobile units having
overseas consignment locations in the current NAVMTO
Freight Forwarding Guide or cargo consigned to overseas
shore stations is eligible for OPLIFT. [Ref. 2]
This definition served to limit the potential cost
savings that could be realized by precluding the movement of
material between CONUS locations and from overseas locations
to CONUS. The Fleets, however, have not followed this
guidance and have consistently moved OPLIFT cargo between
CONUS locations and from overseas locations to CONUS.
2. Priority of Space Allocation
The following OPLIFT space allocation was
recommended by the CNO, consistent with the requirements of
the Fleet CINCS:
1. Fleet Freight. Cargo issued by various supply sources
in and around port areas and destined for mobile
units. The cargo will be coordinated for loading by
direct liaison between fleet OPLIFT representatives
and water terminal operators and take priority over
all other OPLIFT cargo.
2. General Cargo. Non-fleet freight cargo (usually
heavy, bulky, and low priority shipments having no
specific required delivery date) originating outside a
port area for shipment to, from, or between overseas
activities. Space for general cargo originating in
CONUS will be offered to NAVMTO Eastern and Western
Area representatives who will coordinate the movement
and loading with fleet representatives and water
terminal operators. General cargo originating
overseas (for shipment to CONUS or to another overseas
area) will be coordinated by Navy Sea Cargo
Coordinators (NAVSEACARCOORD) and overseas fleet
representatives. Space for general cargo will be
offered to NAVMTO and NAVSEACARCOORDS , as applicable,
only after all fleet freight space requirements have
been satisfied.
3. Other Freight. Other cargo carried on an OPLIFT basis
which would not have otherwise entered the defense or
commercial transportation system or have been billed
to SWT funds may be shipped OPLIFT when all freight
and general cargo requirements have been satisfied.
[Ref. 2]
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The recominended space allocation system places fleet
organic cargo as priority three. Fleet organic cargo is
material owned by the Fleet CINCS, i.e., items in the
custody or plant account records of field activities or
material in custody of afloat units. Movement of such
material in the DTS is funded from the Fleet CINCS
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) appropriation. For
this reason it is logical to conclude that the Fleet CINCS
might place the highest priority on moving this type of
cargo. The Atlantic Fleet, has in fact, given the highest
OPLIFT loading priority to fleet organic cargo.
In addressing the priority of space allocation,
provisions were discussed by the CNO for moving general
cargo to CONUS from overseas areas. The CNO definition of
OPLIFT, however, precludes the movement of general cargo by
OPLIFT unless it is consigned to overseas shore stations.
This is an example of one of the inconsistencies found in
OPLIFT implementation guidance. Similar inconsistencies can
also be found in the implementation guidance provided by the
Fleets.
3 . Program Manager
The CNO has designated NAVMTO Norfolk, a field
activity of the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM)
,
as the OPLIFT Program Manager. The following responsibili-
ties have been assigned to NAVMTO:
1. Through its Eastern and Western Area representatives,
coordinate the OPLIFT movement of general cargo
11
(non-fleet freight) from CONUS to overseas areas and
maintain direct liaison with fleet and water terminal
OPLIFT representatives.
2. Collect, on a monthly basis, tonnage information on
diversions of fleet freight and general cargo to
OPLIFT from those reporting Commanders designated by
the Fleet CINCS.
3. Compute and report all cost avoidance attributable to
the OPLIFT of fleet freight and general cargo.
4. Provide technical assistance and guidance on any
aspect of the OPLIFT program. [Ref. 2]
D. THE PROGRAM TODAY
For the purpose of this study a review of OPLIFT cost
savings data was conducted at NAVMTO Norfolk in June 1987.
The review covered the period October 1982 to May 1987.
Accurate and complete cost savings data were not available
prior to October 1982. Cost savings were grouped by fiscal
year. Within each fiscal year the number of lifts reported,
the number of measurement tons (MT) moved (one measurement
ton is equivalent to 40 cubic feet) and the cost savings
attained were examined. The data are summarized in Table
2.1. The findings show that the CNO's revitalization
initiative was met initially with overwhelming support.
However, after achieving a cost savings of almost $12
million in FY 1984, enthusiasm for the use of OPLIFT began
to wane. Annual cost savings have been on the decline since
FY 1984. The reported cost savings through May of FY 1987
is only $1.35 million. The projected cost savings for FY
1987 is only $2 million. Also of importance is the
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TABLE 2.1
TRANSPORTATION COST SAVINGS ATTRIBUTED










1983 112 $ 5,936,278
1984 198 80,661 $11,782,380
1985 178 66,049 $ 5,260,007




30 17.448 $ 1.353.363






45 26,172 $ 2,030,045
Source: Data provided by NAVMTO Norfolk and compiled by
the researcher.
decreasing number of reported OPLIFTs over the same period.
Only 30 OPLIFTs have been reported through May of FY 1987.
The projected number of OPLIFTs for FY 1987 is only 45, a
340 percent decrease from FY 1984.
The data in Table 2 . 2 reflect measurement tons moved by
OPLIFT as a percentage of measurement tons of Navy SWT
funded cargo moved by ocean carrier (this includes all Navy
cargo less mail, Navy Exchange and Navy Commissary material
funded by SWT and charged to the "MSC Cargo" account) . The
percentage has steadily declined since peaking at 13.9
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TABLE 2.2
CARGO MOVED BY OPPORTUNE LIFT AS A PERCENTAGE


























1983 51,954 551,000 9.4%
1984 80,661 581,000 13.9%
1985 66,049 532,000 12.4%
1986 37,504 533,000 7.0%
1987
(through
May) 17.448 370.000 4.7%
TOTAL 253,616 2,567,000 9.9%
1987
(projected
for FY) 26,172 555,000 4.7%
Source: Data provj.ded by NAVSUPSYSCOM and (compiled
by the researcher.
percent in FY 1984. The percentage is expected to fall to
4.7 percent for FY 1987.
Table 2.3 reflects OPLIFT cost savings as a percentage
of the Navy's SWT expenditures for the movement of cargo by
ocean carrier. After peaking at 17 percent in FY 1984, the
percentage has also declined steadily. The percentage is
expected to fall to 4 . 1 percent in FY 1987.
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TABLE 2.3
OPPORTUNE LIFT COST SAVINGS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF NAVY SWT EXPENDITURES FOR THE MOVEMENT
OF CARGO BY OCEAN TRANSPORTATION (MSC-CARGO)
OPLIFT Cost Savings
Navy SWT Expen- as a Percentage of















1983 $ 5,936,278 $ 65,946,000 9.0%
1984 $11,782,380 $ 69,282,000 17.0%
1985 $ 5,260,007 $ 42,898,000 12.2%
1986 $ 4,398,537 $ 47,588,000 9.2%
1987
(through









Source: Data provided by NAVSUPSYSCOM and compiled
by the researcher.
The data in Tables 2 . 2 and 2 . 3 provide a comparison with
ocean carrier service by which the relative importance of
OPLIFT can be shown. Since FY 1983 the tonnage moved by
OPLIFT has equated to 9.9 percent of the tonnage of Navy SWT
funded cargo moved by ocean carrier. During the same time
period the total cost savings attributed to OPLIFT equated to
11.1 percent of the Navy's SWT expenditures for the movement
of cargo by ocean carrier. When compared to ocean carrier
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service, the tonnage moved and cost savings generated by
OPLIFT are significant.
Table 2.4 compares the cost savings achieved through
OPLIFT with all Navy SWT expenditures, not just "MSC Cargo."
From this perspective OPLIFT cost savings are just a small
fraction of the Navy's annual SWT expenditure, averaging just
1.5 percent. This, however, should not lead to the
conclusion that OPLIFT cost savings are not worth pursuing.
A discussion with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
has indicated that SWT funding deficiencies, similar to those
occurring in FY 1976, cannot be ruled out for the future. It
is therefore important that OPLIFT be kept functioning as a
viable cost avoidance program.
E. PERFORMANCE MEASURES
1. The Cost Savings Reporting System
Though it appears from the data in Tables 2 . 1 through
2.4 that the OPLIFT program is in a period of decline, it is
difficult to properly assess how OPLIFT is actually
performing because performance standards have not been
established. On a monthly basis, NAVMTO reports the dollar
cost savings achieved through OPLIFT utilization to
NAVSUPSYSCOM. The significance of these cost savings cannot
be properly evaluated, however, because there is no annual
cost savings performance standard to compare it against.
Monthly cost savings are reported by NAVMTO strictly
in terms of dollars. The cost savings achieved are not
16
TABLE 2.4
OPPORTUNE LIST COST SAVINGS AS A PERCENTAGE












the Total Navy SWT
ExpencJitures
1983 1.3%
1984 $11,782,380 $ 442,294,000 2.7%
1985 $ 5,260,007 $ 387,055,000 1.4%
1986 $ 4,398,537 $ 372,818,000 1.2%
1987
(through
May) $ 1.353.363 5_ 256.495.000 0.5%
TOTAL $28,730,565 $1. 901,116,000 1.5%
1987
(projected
for FY) $ 2,030,045 $ 394,743,000 0.5^
Source: Data provided by NAVSUPSYSCOM and compiled by
the researcher.
compared or measured, by either NAVMTO or NAVSUPSYSCOM,
against an established standard nor are emerging trends and
patterns identified. For these reasons the existing cost
savings reporting system does not go far enough in measuring
OPLIFT performance.
Does a decrease in cost savings from one fiscal year
to the next really indicate a downturn in the OPLIFT program?
This cjuestion can be answered using the data in Table 2.3.
The $6.5 million decrease in cost savings from FY 1984 to FY
17
1985 appears to indicate a significant decline in OPLIFT
performance. If, however, a FY 1985 cost savings goal of 10
percent of that year's Navy SWT expenditure for the movement
of cargo by ocean transportation had been established, a
different conclusion could be reached. The $5.26 million
achieved in cost savings in FY 1985, 12.2 percent of SWT
expenditures on ocean cargo, would have surpassed the
established annual performance goal, indicating satisfactory
OPLIFT performance as a cost savings tool. If an annual cost
savings performance goal of 15 percent of SWT expenditures on
ocean cargo had been established, the goal would not have
been met in FY 1985, indicating unsatisfactory OPLIFT
performance. Only with the establishment of an annual
performance goal against which cost savings can be compared
can a meaningful picture of the performance of OPLIFT as a
cost savings tool and a clear indication of the Program's
direction be determined. As currently established the
transportation cost savings reporting system, because it
focuses solely on dollar cost savings, does not provide a
meaningful picture of OPLIFT performance.
2. Measuring the Efficiency of the Utilization of
OPLIFT Movement Capacity
A different measure of OPLIFT performance could be
obtained by examining underutilized ship movement capacity,
assuming that a demand for OPLIFT movement exists. OPLIFT
movement capacity can be determined by requiring deploying
ships to report OPLIFT "space available" to Fleet OPLIFT
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Coordinators 3 days prior to deployment (this is currently a
requirement in the Pacific Fleet and SIXTH Fleet) . By
comparing total OPLIFT tonnage moved with total OPLIFT "space
availabile," or capacity, a level or measure of movement
capacity utilization efficiency can be established. When
tied to an annual movement capacity utilization performance
goal, such a performance measure would provide a meaningful
picture of whether or not OPLIFT movement capacity is being
used efficiently, i.e., is OPLIFT cargo being moved when
capacity and demand for movement exists.
A downturn in cost savings can result from a downturn
in tonnage moved. The question that must be asked, however,
is whether or not the downturn in tonnage moved was a result
of insufficient OPLIFT movement capacity. Referring back to
Table 2.1, the 14,612 ton decrease in tonnage moved from FY
1984 to FY 1985 appears to indicate a downturn in the
Program. If, however, in FY 1985 a 90 percent OPLIFT
movement capacity utilization goal was established and the
tonnage moved that year was 98 percent of available capacity,
we could conclude that in FY 1985 the Program was efficient
and performing at a satisfactory level despite a decrease in
cost savings and tonnage.
The efficiency with which OPLIFT utilization capacity
is utilized is not currently measured at any level of the
Program (NAVMTO, Fleet CINC or Fleet OPLIFT Coordinator) . If
such a measure were established it would be another
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substantive indicator of OPLIFT performance and, if combined
with a meaningful measure of annual OPLIFT cost savings,
would paint a definitive picture of OPLIFT performance.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the reader with an overview of
the OPLIFT program and current and proposed system cost
savings and performance measurements. The program is
believed to have had its origin during the Vietnam conflict
and proved to be an effective means of reducing
transportation backlogs. When faced with a growing
transportation budget deficit in 1976, OPLIFT was looked upon
as a means of achieving transportation cost savings. The
success of OPLIFT in helping to reduce the transportation
budget deficit hastened its formal implementation at the
fleet level. A growing transportation budget, close scrutiny
of defense spending at all levels, and a decline in the real
growth of OPLIFT cost savings during the period 1978 to 1982
resulted in a CNO initiative to revitalize the program. In
September 1982 the CNO issued an OPLIFT policy statement and
designated NAVMTO Norfolk as Program Manager. As Program
Manager, NAVMTO became responsible for collecting, computing
and reporting cost savings attributable to OPLIFT.
The renewed emphasis on OPLIFT as a cost savings measure
resulted in transportation cost savings in excess of $17.7
million during FYs 1983 and 1984. Cost savings has since
20
declined, with a projected cost savings for FY 1987 of only
$2 million.
The existing cost savings reporting system does not
provide a truly definitive picture of OPLIFT performance.
Cost savings are reported by NAVMTO strictly in terms of
dollars. An annual performance goal against which cost
savings can be compared has not been established. Such a
goal would put the annual transportation cost savings
achieved into a clearer perspective and serve as a more
meaningful indicator of OPLIFT effectiveness. The
establishment of a measure of the efficiency with which
OPLIFT movement capacity is utilized would also provide a
clearer picture of OPLIFT performance.
Chapter III, "Implementation and Management of the
Opportune Lift Program in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets,"
will examine the growth of OPLIFT in the fleet. In addition,
it will compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of both
programs and identify inconsistencies in implementation at
the fleet level.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT OF OPPORTUNE
LIFT IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC FLEETS
To stem growing transportation budget fund deficiencies
in FY 1976, the CNO directed that Fleet CINCS appoint
specific coordinators to insure that deploying and returning
ships offer OPLIFT space for use by Navy shipping
activities. The primary goal of OPLIFT was to reduce the
expenditures of transportation funds held in the Navy's SWT
account. In the Pacific Fleet, formal guidelines were
quickly issued to encourage and regulate the use of OPLIFT.
In the Atlantic Fleet, written guidelines specifically
directed toward the establishment, regulation and
coordination of the OPLIFT program were not immediately
promulgated. Over the ensuing years, different philosophies
and priorities pursuant to the use of OPLIFT developed in
the two fleets. In the Pacific Fleet, OPLIFT was managed in
a decentralized manner, with specific responsibilities and
assignments clearly defined. The Atlantic Fleet, in direct
contrast, pursued OPLIFT in a highly centralized form and
provided little in the way of guidance relevant to
responsibilities and reporting requirements.
A. OPPORTUNE LIFT IN THE ATLANTIC FLEET
Up until October 1982 paragraph 2713 of Commander in
Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet Instruction (CINCLANTFLTINST)
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5400. 2H, the Atlantic Fleet MLSF Manual, was the only source
of formal OPLIFT guidance. The guidance provided was very
general in nature and failed to set forth any specific
reporting requirements for the individual ships other than
to state that they were required to report the space
available for OPLIFT to Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVSURFLANT) seven days prior to
departure from port. In October 1982, more explicit
informal OPLIFT procedures, which were eventually formalized
by CINCLANTFLTINST 4600.2 of 11 June, 1984, were put into
effect. These procedures specifically addressed OPLIFT and
made Atlantic Fleet OPLIFT policy more straightforward. The
procedures, however, deleted the OPLIFT "space available"
reporting requirements for Atlantic Fleet ships.
1. Atlantic Fleet Opportune Lift Policv
Current Atlantic Fleet policy pertaining to the
utilization of fleet surface ships in transporting OPLIFT
cargo is contained in CINCLANTFLTINST 4600.2 dated 11 June
1984. It states that:
Utilization of OPLIFT on fleet ships is strongly
encouraged to reduce Seirvicewide Transportation Costs.
OPLIFT will be aggressively pursued, yet scrutinized to
ensure operational readiness of the lifting unit is not
degraded for either assigned missions or emergent
requirements. . . . OPLIFT on Atlantic Fleet ships shall
routinely be used when such utilization will not adversely
affect operational commitments or require operating
schedule changes. [Ref. 7]
The key concept of Atlantic Fleet policy is that
OPLIFT is to be carried out on a "not to interfere" basis.
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Before OPLIFT cargo is loaded on a deploying vessel, it must
be certain that the ship will stop at the intended port of
discharge. Discussions with NSC Norfolk water terminal
personnel indicate that scheduling uncertainty is a major
reason why Atlantic Fleet OPLIFT requests are refused. This
primarily impacts OPLIFT cargo destined for the
Mediterranean
.
Due to limited storage space, the Atlantic Fleet
does not authorize the OPLIFT of perishable cargo or
material of a pilferable nature, such as small arms,
controlled equipage. Navy Exchange merchandise and alcoholic
beverages. Hazardous materials and "dirty cargoes," such as
cement and asphalt, are closely scrutinized prior to loading
to ensure that their movement does not affect the
operational readiness of the lifting unit. Data obtained
from NAVMTO shows that cargo of a general nature and boats
account for over 70 percent of the OPLIFT tonnage moved in
the Atlantic Fleet.
2 . Priority of Space Allocation
When the request for utilization of OPLIFT space
exceeds the lift capacity of the loading vessel, the
following general order of loading priority prevails in the
Atlantic Fleet:
1. Fleet Organic Cargo. This consists of CINCLANTFLT
owned material, such as SEAL Patrol Boats and repair
equipment, the movement of which in the DTS is funded
by the CINCLANTFLT 0&M,N appropriation. The use of
SWT is not authorized to fund the movement of Fleet
organic cargo.
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2. Fleet Freight. This consists of cargo issued by
various supply sources in and around port areas that
is destined for ships and units operating overseas or
for overseas shore activities, such as Guantanamo Bay
and Naples. Fleet freight accounts for approximately
15 percent of the OPLIFT cargo moved in the Atlantic
Fleet.
3. General OPLIFT Cargo. This consists of non-fleet
organic cargo and non-fleet freight, such as
construction material and industrial equipment and
materials, the movement of which is normally paid for
by SWT funds.
4. Other OPLIFT Materials. This includes all other
materials carried on an OPLIFT basis which cannot be
billed to SWT funds. Privately owned vehicles of
service members transferring from or to overseas duty
stations make up the majority of this category of
cargo. [Ref. 7]
In the Atlantic Fleet, loading priority is given to
fleet organic cargo in order to reduce CINCLANTFLT 0&M,N
expenditures. Though the movement of fleet organic cargo by
OPLIFT can improve the financial management position of
CINCLANTFLT by "avoiding" 0&M,N costs, it does nothing to
reduce Navy SWT costs. For this reason, giving loading
priority to fleet organic cargo appears to be in direct
conflict with the CNO's OPLIFT policy which encourages the
use of OPLIFT to reduce SWT costs.
3. Cargo Eligibility
Atlantic Fleet policy relative to cargo eligibility
states that:
Cargo destined to mobile units having an overseas consign-
ment location in the current NAVMTO Freight Forwarding
Guide is eligible for OPLIFT. OPLIFT shipments bound for
units not listed in the Freight Forwarding Guide require
prior shipment approval from NAVMTO. [Ref. 7]
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This guidance fails to address the eligibility of
general cargo and fleet freight consigned to overseas shore
activities, cargo moving from overseas to CONUS and cargo
moving between CONUS locations. These eligibility criteria
have not, however, been strictly enforced by COMNAVSURFLANT
in its role as Atlantic Fleet OPLIFT Coordinator.
4. Atlantic Fleet Opportune Lift Coordinator
COMNAVSURFLANT has been designated by CINCLANTFLT as
executive agent for the Atlantic Fleet OPLIFT program. The
close proximity to NAVMTO, NSC Norfolk and the Norfolk
waterfront, where over 97 percent of the Atlantic Fleet's
CLSF and Amphibious Force ships (the two biggest supporters
of OPLIFT) are home ported, facilitates COMNAVSURFLANT •
s
OPLIFT coordination role. As executive agent,
COMNAVSURFLANT is responsible for:
1. Implementation of the Atlantic Fleet OPLIFT policy,
with reporting instructions as necessary.
(Discussions with the COMNAVSURFLANT staff revealed
that implementing instructions were not forthcoming.




Liaison between CLSF units and shipping activities for
the OPLIFT of fleet freight.
3. Coordination of space available inputs with NAVMTO,
the coordinator for the potential OPLIFT of non-fleet
freight.
4. Providing NAVMTO with monthly reports summarizing the
OPLIFT of fleet freight and general cargo by surface
vessels. Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet (COMNAVAIRLANT) is responsible for providing
monthly reports to NAVMTO when AIRLANT units (aircraft
carriers) move material by OPLIFT.
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5. Authorizing OPLIFTs of "other OPLIFT material"
requested by active duty and retired military
personnel based on established loading priorities and
the ability of Commanding Officers of ships to lift
the specific items. [Ref. 7]
5. Interface with SIXTH Fleet Units
Commander SIXTH Fleet has assigned responsibility
for coordinating OPLIFT in the Mediterranean theater of
operations to Commander Service Force SIXTH Fleet based in
Naples. SIXTH Fleet guidance is limited and very general in
nature. The only reporting requirement set forth in the
SIXTH Fleet Logistics Manual is that CLSF ships are required
to advise SIXTH Fleet logisticians and shore activities of
the space available to carry OPLIFT cargo seven days prior
to entering the ports of Rota, Naples, Augusta Bay and Souda
Bay. [Ref. 8]
B. OPPORTUNE LIFT IN THE PACIFIC FLEET
The earliest written Pacific Fleet OPLIFT guidance
identified during the course of this study is Commander in
Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet Instruction (CINCPACFLTNST) 4600. 3B
of 12 May, 1967. OPLIFT reporting requirements for
individual ships have been in effect since 1978 when
Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Instruction (COMNAVSURFPACINST) 4600. 2B was issued [Ref. 9].
In 1984 the most recent CINCPACFLT general OPLIFT guidance
was issued. This was followed in 1985 by detailed guidance
from COMNAVSURFPAC , the Pacific Fleet OPLIFT manager.
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1. Pacific Fleet Opportune Lift Policy
Current Pacific Fleet policy on the use of fleet
surface ships in transporting cargo by OPLIFT is contained
in CINCPACFLTINST 4600. 3J dated 16 October, 1984. It states
that:
Use of OPLIFT for the movement of selected types of cargo
and equipment is encouraged when this movement will result
in conservation of shipping funds, support emergency
situations, ensure delivery, or serve to enhance unit and
personnel morale. OPLIFT is normally not suited for
delivery and shipment of time critical cargo, personal
mail or items which if carried would reduce fleet
readiness. [Ref. 10]
As in the Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet ships are
used for OPLIFT only when such use will not adversely affect
operational commitments or require operating schedule
changes. The OPLIFT of cargo and equipment which requires
the installation or removal of tie-down pad eyes, cleats,
sheathing or battens or that is "dirty" in nature, such as
cement, is not normally authorized. Further restrictions
apply to cargoes that may endanger the safety of crew (such
as certain types of hazardous material), reduce the ship's
security posture, cause instability during the ship's
transit, or otherwise hazard the vessel. [Ref. 10]
Pacific Fleet policy holds that OPLIFT can be best
used in support of the following:
Minor unit moves, shipment of replacement material and
equipment to deployed Middle Pacific (MIDPAC) and Western
Pacific (WESTPAC) units, return of material or equipment
from MIDPAC and WESTPAC units, shipment of "Project
Handclasp" material (goodwill material donated by
charitable organizations) , shipment of privately owned
material belonging to members of the Armed Forces (active
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and retired) , shipments of conventional ordnance under
specific conditions (the vessel must be sheathed) , and
shipments which cannot be accomplished by single manager
resources. [Ref. 10]
2. Who May Use Opportune Lift
The Pacific Fleet has instituted strict guidelines
on who may use OPLIFT. In general, authorization for the
use of OPLIFT is extended to the following:
1. All agencies of the U.S. Government for the shipment
of government owned property.
2. All members of the Armed Forces of the United States,
both active and retired, and unremarried widows or
widowers of deceased retired service members.
3. The West Coast Director of Project Handclasp. [Ref.
10]
The CNO's intention in implementing the OPLIFT
program was to reduce transportation costs paid to
commercial ocean carriers for shipping Navy sponsored cargo.
Pacific Fleet interpretation of OPLIFT has expanded the




Priority of Space Allocation
The following general order of priority is used in
allocating OPLIFT space in the Pacific Fleet:





Cargo and equipment for use in support of
operationally deployed units (includes fleet organic
cargo)
.
3 Conventional ordnance movements required by forces in
direct support of operational commitments. (NAVMTO
data shows that ordnance accounted for 31 percent of
the OPLIFT cargo moved in the Pacific Fleet.)
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4. Cargo and equipment for shore-based military
installations.
5. Household goods and privately owned vehicles which are
eligible for funded transportation.
6. Household goods and privately owned vehicles which are
not eligible for funded transportation. (As in the
Atlantic Fleet, this is a morale enhancement program
mainly utilized by service members reporting to or
returning from an overseas assignment.)
7. Project Handclasp material.
8. Other authorized material along with privately owned
vehicles belonging to unremarried widows or widowers
of deceased retired service members which are not
eligible for funded transportation. [Ref. 10]
The Pacific Fleet, in contrast to the Atlantic
Fleet, gives the highest loading priority to fleet freight
cargo. Special preference does not appear to be given to
CINCPACFLT organic cargo for the purpose of saving
CINCPACFLT 0&M,N funds.
4. Pacific Fleet Opportune Lift Manager
The OPLIFT Manager for the Pacific Fleet is
COMNAVSURFPAC . As OPLIFT Manager, COMNAVSURFPAC is
responsible for providing detailed instructions for the
execution of OPLIFT within the Pacific Fleet. In addition,
COMNAVSURFPAC is responsible for collecting data and
providing a monthly report to NAVMTO identifying all
government sponsored material shipped by OPLIFT. Rather
than concern itself with cost savings for just Navy
sponsored cargo, the Pacific Fleet reports cost savings for
all government agencies and departments. In addition to
Navy cargo, discussion with the COMNAVSURFPAC staff has
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indicated that significant quantities of Marine Corps cargo
have been shipped via OPLIFT, particularly from Okinawa to
Camp Pendleton, California.
As OPLIFT manager, COMNAVSURPAC is tasked with
assigning coordination responsibilities for the Pacific
Fleet. In contrast to the Atlantic Fleet, the homeports of
the two biggest supporters of Pacific Fleet OPLIFT, the CLSF
and Amphibious Force, are spread throughout the Pacific.
This necessitates a greater level of coordination. To
achieve this, COMNAVSURFPAC has assigned the following
coordination responsibilities to the following activities:
1. Commander Amphibious Group THREE (COMPHIBGRU THREE)
.
Offer space to COMSURFPAC for OPLIFTs on Amphibious
units departing the Eastern Pacific [EASTPAC] for the
Hawaii area (MIDPAC) and WESTPAC 60 days prior to
deployment. Coordinate OPLIFT on ships assigned to
COMPHIBGRU THREE.
2. Commander Naval Surface Group Western Pacific.
(COMNAVSURFGRU WESTPAC) [CTF 73]. Coordinate and
approve OPLIFT on ships operating within the SEVENTH
Fleet. Establish an internal monitoring system for
the OPLIFT program.
3. Commander Service Group ONE (COMSERVGRU ONE).
Coordinate OPLIFTs on ships assigned to COMSERVGRU ONE
that originate in CONUS. Coordinate with Commander
Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific on the OPLIFT of
ammunition that originates in MIDPAC.
4. Commander Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific
(COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC) . Act as COMNAVSURFPAC
representative for MIDPAC for the approval and
assignment of OPLIFT from the MIDPAC area. Coordinate
and approve OPLIFT on ships assigned to COMNAVSURFGRU
MIDPAC, and those originating and terminating in the
MIDPAC area. Coordinate the OPLIFT of ammunition with
COMSERVGRU ONE. Establish an internal monitoring
program for OPLIFT.
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5. Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group (s) [COMCRUDES-
GRU(s)]. Coordinate OPLIFTs on ships assigned to
applicable COMCRUDESGRU Commands.
6. Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet [COMNAV-
AIRPAC] . Coordinate OPLIFT on ships (aircraft
carriers) assigned to COMNAVAIRPAC . [Ref. 11]
Figure 3.1 provides a clearer picture of the Pacific

















Figure 3 . 1 Pacific Fleet OPLIFT Approval Authorities
5. Vessel Reporting Requirements
Pacific Fleet ships, excepting Amphibious Force
ships, are required to report space available for OPLIFT not
later than 30 days prior to departing from an Eastern
Pacific or Mid Pacific port to another port. Amphibious
ships must report not later than 60 days prior to departure.
Such reports make potential OPLIFT users aware of a vessel '
s
lift capacity and planned movement, thus allowing them
sufficient time to plan OPLIFT shipments. Space available
reports are not required for ships departing from Western
Pacific ports. OPLIFT loading and offloading reports are
32
also required of all Pacific Fleet Ships. These reports
serve to provide a chain of custody and accountability for
the OPLIFT cargo. [Ref. 11]
C. PROGRAM COMPARISON
Different philosophies exist in the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets as to the management of OPLIFT. In the Atlantic
Fleet the OPLIFT program is highly centralized in its
administration, with COMNAVSURFLANT assigned primary
coordination and approval responsibility. In the Pacific
Fleet, largely because of geography and fleet dispersion,
the OPLIFT program is more decentralized.
CINCPACFLT and COMNAVSURFPAC have detailed specific
responsibilities through their formal OPLIFT instructions,
thus reducing the potential for misunderstanding and
misconception. The Atlantic Fleet has not issued as
detailed instructions as the Pacific Fleet and relies more
on informal and unwritten procedures.
The reporting procedures in the Pacific Fleet make the
OPLIFT program more visible to potential users by providing
them with the lift capacities and planned movement of
possible OPLIFT candidates. In the Atlantic Fleet,
potential users, excepting NSC Norfolk, NAVMTO, and
Mediterranean shore activities, are not necessarily aware of
this information since detailed OPLIFT "space available"
reports are only required in the SIXTH Fleet operating area.
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The priority of OPLIFT space allocation in the Atlantic
Fleet gives preference to fleet organic cargo. As such the
primary emphasis is on reducing CINCLANTFLT 0&M,N
expenditures. In the Pacific Fleet, the first priority is
given to cargo and equipment for operationally deployed
units, a priority which facilitates SWT cost avoidance.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented to the reader the OPLIFT
management philosophies and practices of the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets. The circumstances leading to the formal
implementation of the Program were discussed. The
utilization policies, management structures, reporting
requirements and critical elements of each Fleet's OPLIFT
program were detailed and compared.
Chapter IV will examine OPLIFT relevant to frequency of
utilization, quantity of tonnage moved, transportation cost
savings achieved, types of cargo moved, categories of ship
moving the cargo and traffic routes over which the cargo is
transported to determine program trends and patterns.
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IV. TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN THE OPPORTUNE LIFT PROGRAM
Monthly OPLIFT reports submitted to NAVMTO by
COMNAVSURFLANT and COMNAVSURFPAC contain the background data
necessary to substantiate OPLIFT dollar savings. This
background data includes the ports of embarkation and
debarkation, name of the vessels conducting the OPLIFT,
commodity moved, piece/weight/cube and measurement tons
transported. An MSC billing rate, the rate that would have
been paid if the cargo was shipped by commercial ocean
transportation, is determined by NAVMTO based on ports of
embarkation, ports of debarkation and commodity. Actual
cost savings are determined by NAVMTO by multiplying the
MSC billing rate by the measurements tons moved. [Ref. 12]
Since NAVMTO began collecting data on OPLIFT utilization
in October 1982, it has concentrated on reporting only
transportation cost savings. The background data are used
only to substantiate OPLIFT cost savings and are not
otherwise analyzed or reported on. That data, however, can
be quite useful in the determination of OPLIFT trends and
patterns.
For the purpose of this study all NAVMTO background data
on OPLIFT were analyzed for the period October 1982 through
May 1987. The purpose of the analysis was to examine OPLIFT
in terms of the following:
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1. Fleet utilization relevant to frequency of use,
tonnage moved and cost savings achieved;
2. Categories of cargo shipped;
3. Categories or types of ship utilized;
4
.
Categories of cargo transported by different ship
types ; and
5. Traffic routes utilized.
A. FLEET UTILIZATION OF OPPORTUNE LIFT
Table 4.1 summarizes OPLIFT utilization in terms of
three factors: volume of use (number of OPLIFTs conducted)
,
measurement tons moved and transportation cost savings
achieved at the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet levels. The data
in Table 4.1 appears to reflect a sharp decline since FY
1984 for all three utilization factors in both the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleet. The apparent downturn has been
attributed to a number of different causes, all of which
will be discussed in this section.
The relative stability of the Navy's SWT budget in
recent years has precluded funding deficiencies, such as
occurred in FY 1976, and has led to a diminished sense of
urgency at the top management levels (CNO, NAVSUPSYSCOM and
Fleet CINCS) concerning OPLIFT use. Discussions with NAVMTO
Norfolk and NAVSUPSYSCOM, however, have indicated the need
for a renewed emphasis on OPLIFT utilization as a cost
avoidance vehicle.
Changes at the fleet level have also affected OPLIFT
utilization. Deploying and returning Pacific Fleet
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amphibious ships previously loaded and unloaded vehicles and
equipment in Hawaii. This allowed for the frequent movement
of OPLIFT cargo on the relatively empty ships during the
transits from California to Hawaii and Hawaii to California.
Operational changes in FY 1987, however, have resulted in
the amphibious ships now loading prior to leaving California
and unloading on their return to California. This has
significantly reduced available OPLIFT space. Data obtained
from NAVMTO shows that California to Hawaii and Hawaii to
California were the two traffic routes accounting for the
largest percentage of OPLIFT tonnage moved. The loss of
potential OPLIFT space on these routes has had a negative
impact on OPLIFT utilization.
Fuel constraints brought on by funding shortfalls have
also impacted OPLIFT. Reduced fuel allotments at the fleet
level have resulted in reduced "steaming" hours. Training
cruises that formerly departed from CONUS for Hawaii,
Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico have now become "local
training" evolutions. Such training cruises served as a
means of moving OPLIFT cargo. The reduction in "steaming
hours" has played a part in the current OPLIFT downturn.
Ship Commanding Officers have become more reluctant to
transport OPLIFT cargo. Transporting OPLIFT cargo means
more work for the ship's crew. Cargo must be loaded,
manifested, tied down and braced for sea, protected and
unloaded. More responsibility is placed on the Commanding
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Officer since he becomes accountable for the safety of the
OPLIFT cargo. The ship's crew is often against the moving
of OPLIFT cargo. The concern of the crew upon returning
from a long deployment lies in departing the ship as quickly
as possible, therefore unloading OPLIFT cargo is not always
the highest, priority for the crew. There currently exists
no tangible incentive for a ship to carry OPLIFT cargo.
Only drawbacks exist and they have influenced the
willingness of ship Commanding Officers to carry OPLIFT
cargo. If the ship is unwilling to transport the cargo, the
cargo will not move. This unwillingness of ships to carry
OPLIFT material has impacted the OPLIFT program in both the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
Contributing to the downturn of OPLIFT in the Atlantic
Fleet was the replacement of NSC Norfolk, by NSC
Jacksonville, as the point of entry for transportation
priority three (the lowest priority and therefore eligible
for movement by OPLIFT) requisitions for Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba and Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. There are fewer
ships, with smaller cargo capacity, available for OPLIFT in
Jacksonville thereby reducing the potential for conducting
OPLIFT. [Ref. 13]
The completion of military construction projects in
Guantanamo Bay has also resulted in decreased OPLIFT
utilization in the Atlantic Fleet. A steady flow of
construction material, such as structural steel, forklifts,
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tractors, mixers and vehicles, was moved to Guantanamo Bay
via OPLIFT in FY 1983 and 1984. No major construction has
taken place since that time, thereby negating the need for
OPLIFT. [Ref. 13]
The data in Table 4.1 also point out some significant
differences in the volume of OPLIFT, number of measurement
tons moved and cost savings achieved between the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleets. Comparatively speaking, the OPLIFT
program in the Pacific Fleet has consistently been more
productive than that of the Atlantic Fleet. In the
aggregate, the Pacific Fleet has utilized more OPLIFTs,
moved more tonnage and achieved greater cost savings. Only
in FY 1983, when it achieved a higher frequency of OPLIFT
use, did the Atlantic Fleet surpass the Pacific Fleet in any
utilization factor. The higher degree of utilization in the
Pacific Fleet can in part be attributed to the detailed
OPLIFT implementing instructions provided by CINCPACFLT and
COMNAVSURFPAC . These instructions provide clear-cut
responsibilities and assignments, and serve to facilitate
OPLIFT coordination and utilization.
Figures 4.1 through 4.3 show graphically the trends in
the volume of OPLIFT utilization, tonnage moved and cost
savings achieved at the Atlantic, Pacific and Fleet-wide
levels since FY 1983.
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Figure 4.3 Trend in OPLIFT Cost Savings, FYs 1983-1987
43
B. CATEGORIES OF CARGO MOVED BY OPPORTUNE LIFT
Appendix A contains detailed data on the categories of
cargo moved by OPLIFT for the period FY 1983 through May FY
1987. These data will be summarized in this section.
To support its monthly transportation cost savings
analysis, NAVMTO prepares a worksheet which analyzes each
OPLIFT reported. The worksheet uses the background
information on commodities moved to classify the cargo into
different categories. For the purpose of this study the
commodities moved were broken down into six broad
categories: aircraft, boats, ordnance, general cargo
(includes fleet freight) , vehicles (includes military,
wheeled and tracked vehicles) and "other" cargo. Table 4.2
summarizes the six categories of cargo moved.
The data in Table 4.2 and Appendix A show that in the
Atlantic Fleet general cargo was the primary cargo moved by
OPLIFT, accounting for 52 percent of the tonnage and 47
percent of the cost savings. Ordnance, accounting for 31
percent of the tonnage and 38 percent of the cost savings,
was the primary cargo moved in the Pacific Fleet. In
contrast to the Atlantic Fleet, general cargo accounted for
only 18 percent of the tonnage moved and 12 percent of the
cost savings in the Pacific Fleet. At the Fleet-wide level,
general cargo was the primary cargo in terms of tonnage
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The dominance of general cargo movements in the Atlantic
Fleet is attributed to the large quantities of fleet freight
and general cargo moved from CONUS to the Mediterranean and
back in support of deployed units and overseas shore
activities. Unlike the Middle and Western Pacific, there
are no supply depots in the Mediterranean and the degree of
dependence on CONUS resupply is much higher. Fleet freight
and general supplies are frequently moved from CONUS to the
Mediterranean as OPLIFT cargo on deploying CLSF ships.
The higher percentage of ordnance movements in the
Pacific Fleet is attributed to the location of Naval
Magazines in Guam and the Philippines. There are no Naval
Magazines outside of CONUS in the Atlantic, thus diminishing
the Atlantic Fleet's need to move ordnance.
Table 4 . 3 shows the average transportation cost savings
per measurement ton moved for the different categories of
cargo. In the Atlantic Fleet the greatest cost savings per
ton was in the OPLIFT of ordnance. In the Pacific Fleet the
greatest cost savings occurred in the OPLIFT of boats and
ordnance. Fleet-wide, ordnance provided the greatest cost
savings. The data in Table 4.3 are a rough indicator of the
categories of cargo providing the greatest transportation
cost savings per ton and are, therefore, useful for
prioritizing categories of cargo to be loaded under
conditions of limited space availability in order to
maximize transportation cost savings.
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TABLE 4.3
AVERAGE COST SAVINGS PER MEASUREMENT TON MOVED,









Aircraft $118 $104 $105
Ordnance $157 $148 $149
Boats $108 $150 $137
General Cargo $ 90 $ 73 $ 82
Vehicles $ 84 $113 $102
Other $ 66 $ 90 $ 80
Source: Data compiled from NAVMTO Norfolk by the
researcher.
C. CATEGORIES OF SHIP UTILIZED FOR OPPORTUNE LIFT
The names of the vessels conducting OPLIFT are reported
to NAVMTO on a monthly basis as a part of the OPLIFT
substantiating data. Given the ship's name, its classifica-
tion or type (CGN, AOR, AFS, etc.) can be easily determined.
For the purpose of this study the ship types utilized for
OPLIFT were grouped into six categories:
1. Combat Logistic Support Force (CLSF) : AE, AOE, AO,
AOR, AFS and all ships of the MSC's Naval Fleet
Auxiliary Force;
2. Amphibious Force: LCU, LST, LSD, LPD, LCC, LKA, LPH
and LHA;
3. Combatant: DD, DDG, FF, FFG, CG, CGN and BB;
4. Tender: AR, AD and AS;
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5. Aircraft Carrier: CV and CVN; and
6. Other: includes all other ship types.
Appendix B contains detailed data on the categories of ship
utilized for OPLIFT for the period October 1982 through May
1987. These data will be summarized in this section.
In the Atlantic Fleet CLSF ships accounted for 60
percent of the OPLIFTs conducted, 57 percent of the tonnage
moved and 60 percent of the cost savings achieved.
Amphibious ships, in contrast, accounted for 29 percent of
the OPLIFTs conducted, 39 percent of the tonnage moved and
36 percent of the cost savings. In the Pacific Fleet the
pattern was somewhat reversed with amphibious ships
accounting for 37 percent of the OPLIFTs, 57 percent of the
tonnage moved and 52 percent of the cost savings while CLSF
ships accounted for 56 percent of the OPLIFTs, 4 percent of
the tonnage moved and 45 percent of the cost savings.
Fleet-wide CLSF ships accounted for the greatest percentage
of OPLIFTs while amphibious ships moved the largest
percentage of tonnage and achieved the greatest percentage
of cost savings. Table 4.4 is a summarization of the data
contained in Appendix B.
The utilization of Combatants, Tenders, Aircraft
Carriers and "Other" ships for OPLIFT purposes was very
limited. Aircraft Carriers, despite their large size and
holding capacity, were rarely utilized to carry OPLIFT cargo
and accounted for only four OPLIFTs in almost five years.
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TABLE 4.4
SUMMARY OF OPPORTUNE LIFT BY SHIP CATEGORIES,
OCTOBER 1982 THROUGH MAY 1987









CLSF 151 41,494 203 72,781 354 114,275
Amphibious 73 28,534 136 103,381 209 131,921
Combatant 13 417 10 581 23 998
Tender 7 612 12 2,527 19 3,139
Carrier 1 503 3 2,294 4 2,797
Other 6 465 1 21 7 486
Total 251 72,025 365 181,591 616 253,616
Cost Savings
Ship
Category Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
CLSF $4, 287,704 $ 9,639,807 $13 ,927,511
Amphibious $2, 624,859 $11,339,803 $13 ,964,662
Combatant $ 51,085 $ 61,714 $ 112,799
Tencier $ 81,667 $ 244,596 $ 326,263
Carrier $ 44,113 $ 315,647 $ 359,760
Other 5_ 38.304 ^ 1.266 $ 39.570
Total $7,127,732 $21,602,833 $28,730,565
Notes: MT = Measurement Tons
Source: Data compiled from NAVMTO Norfolk by the
researcher.
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Their infrequent use can be attributed to their unique
function which requires the utilization of all available
deck space for aircraft storage.
D. CATEGORIES OF OPPORTUNE LIFT CARGO MOVED BY DIFFERENT
SHIP TYPES
Appendix C provides detailed data on the categories of
OPLIFT cargo moved by the different ship types. These data
are summarized in Table 4.5. In the Atlantic Fleet CLSF
ships were primarily utilized to move general cargo while
amphibious ships were used to move general cargo and boats.
In the Pacific Fleet CLSF ships were used primarily to move
ordnance. Very little general cargo was moved by CLSF ships
in the Pacific Fleet. Amphibious ships assigned to the
Pacific Fleet were used primarily to move aircraft, general
cargo and boats.
The loading patterns reflected in Table 4 . 5 are
consistent with the lift capabilities of the different
categories of ships. The extra deck space normally
available on amphibious ships facilitates the movement of
large and bulky items. Seventy-three percent of aircraft,
81 percent of boats and 77 percent of vehicles, all items
considered to be large and bulky in nature, were moved by
amphibious ships. CLSF ships, many of which are designed to
carry explosives and ordnance, moved 99 percent of the
ordnance. The only inconsistency rests in the fact that
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fleet-wide. The CLSF normally brings to mind terms such as
"underway replenishment" and "resupply." These are terms
that are associated with the transfer of fleet freight and
general cargo. While CLSF ships were utilized for that
purpose in the Atlantic Fleet, amphibious ships moved the
majority of general cargo in the Pacific Fleet and fleet-
wide.
E. OPPORTUNE LIFT MAJOR TRAFFIC ROUTES
For the purpose of this study the OPLIFT ports of
embarkation and debarkation were grouped by geographic
traffic area. Appendix D provides a geographical
description of the different OPLIFT traffic areas utilized.
A regular line of travel from one traffic area to
another traffic area is called a traffic route. From
October 1982 through May 1987, a total of 77 different
traffic routes were utilized for OPLIFT purposes. Detailed
data on the traffic routes utilized are provided in Appendix
E. In analyzing the traffic routes utilized, it was found
that 13 routes, eight in the Pacific and five in the
Atlantic, accounted for 79 percent of both the tonnage moved
and the cost savings achieved. Table 4.6 reflects these 13
major traffic routes utilized. Fleet-wide, the California
Coast to Hawaiian Islands and Hawaiian Islands to California
Coast routes accounted for the most tonnage moved. The
greatest fleet-wide cost savings occurred on the Marianas to
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In the Atlantic Fleet, 25 different traffic routes were
utilized for the purpose of OPLIFT with the five major
routes accounting for 86 percent of both the tonnage moved
and the cost savings achieved. In the Pacific Fleet, 52
different traffic routes were utilized for OPLIFT with the
eight major routes accounting for 75 percent of the tonnage
moved and 78 percent of the cost savings.
The three traffic areas accounting for the most tonnage
embarked were the California Coast, Atlantic Coast and
Philippines, accounting for 18, 16 and 14 percent,
respectively, of all OPLIFT tonnage loaded (Table E.7). The
three traffic areas accounting for the most OPLIFT tonnage
disembarked were the California Coast, Hawaiian Islands and
Atlantic Coast", accounting for 37, 15 and 13 percent,
respectively, of all tonnage offloaded (Table E.8).
The flow of OPLIFT cargo between the major traffic areas
appears to be consistent with the levels of concentration of
Naval forces and shore-based activities in those areas.
Appendix F provides detailed data for the 13 major traffic
routes relative to the categories of cargo moved and the
ship types moving them. The data shows that each of the
major traffic routes can be categorized by the movement of
one or two specific cargoes on primarily one ship type, as




This chapter has examined OPLIFT in terms of volume of
use, tonnage moved, cost savings achieved, category of cargo
moved, ship type utilized and traffic routes travelled. The
OPLIFT program appears to have been in a state of decline
since FY 1985. A number of factors have contributed to the
apparent downturn; among them are decreased high level
interest in OPLIFT, changes in fleet operating procedures,
fuel constraints and a growing unwillingness of ship
Commanding Officers to transport OPLIFT cargo. Different
patterns in terms of categories of cargo moved and ship type
utilized have also developed in the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets.
In the Atlantic Fleet, the primary category of cargo
moved is general cargo. CLSF ships have accounted for the
majority of Atlantic Fleet tonnage moved. Five major
traffic routes in the Atlantic Fleet accounted for 86
percent of both the cost savings achieved and the tonnage
moved. The West Mediterranean to Atlantic Coast and
Atlantic Coast to West Mediterranean traffic routes
accounted for the most tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet.
The major categories of cargo moved in the Pacific Fleet
are ordnance and aircraft. Amphibious ships have accounted
for the majority of cargo moved in the Pacific Fleet while
CLSF ships transported 99 percent of the ordnance. Eight
major traffic routes accounted for 75 percent of the tonnage
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and 78 percent of the cost savings in the Pacific Fleet.
The California Coast to Hawaiian Islands and Hawaiian
Islands to California Coast traffic routes accounted for the
most tonnage moved.
Chapter V will develop a multiple linear regression
model to predict total monthly OPLIFT cost savings.
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V. A MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL TO PREDICT
TOTAL MONTHLY OPPORTUNE LIFT COST SAVINGS
A. DEVELOPING THE MODEL
1. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
Fleet-wide or total monthly cost savings attributed
to OPLIFT have fluctuated widely. Total monthly OPLIFT cost
savings is a function of both the monthly OPLIFT tonnage
moved and the number of monthly OPLIFTs conducted by the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Appendix G reflects the total
monthly cost savings attributed to OPLIFT, the monthly
OPLIFT tonnage moved by the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and
the number of monthly OPLIFTs conducted by the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets for the 56 month period October 1982 through
May 1987. From Appendix G it can be observed that total
monthly cost savings have been as high as $2,693,518 for
March 1984 and as low as $1,002 for April 1987. A model
which can predict total monthly OPLIFT cost savings can be a
useful management tool for the purposes of planning and
controlling the OPLIFT program.
Regression analysis is a statistical technique often
used for the purpose of predicting. The objective of
regression analysis is the development of a statistical
model which uses information about a set of independent or
explanatory variables in order to estimate the expected
value of some variable believed to be dependent or
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responsive. [Ref. 14:p. 203]. In multiple linear
regression analysis several explanatory variables are used
to. predict the value of a dependent variable.
In developing a multiple linear regression model to
predict the dependent variable total monthly OPLIFT cost
savings, four explanatory variables were evaluated—monthly
tonnage moved by OPLIFT in the Atlantic Fleet, the number of
monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic Fleet, monthly
tonnage moved by OPLIFT in the Pacific Fleet and the number
of monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific Fleet.
The widespread availability of various computer
packages has led to a great expansion in the application of
regression models. For the purpose of this study, Minitab,
a general purpose data analysis system, was used to develop
the multiple linear regression model for the prediction of
total monthly OPLIFT cost savings.
2 . The Regression Ecmation
The regression equation for the multiple linear
regression model for total monthly OPLIFT cost savings is as
follows:
yi = bo + + bixii + b2X2i + bs^Si + ^4X41
where
:
yj^ = predicted total monthly OPLIFT cost
savings for observation i
59
Idq = Y intercept
bi = slope of Y with variable x^ holding
variables X2, X3 and X4 constant
b2 = slope of Y with variable X2 holding
variables x^, X3 and X4 constant
b3 = slope of Y with variable X3 holding
variables x^, X2 and X4 constant
b4 = slope of Y with variable X4 holding
variables x^, X2 and X3 constant
^li ~ monthly OPLIFT tonnage moved in the
Atlantic Fleet for observation i
X2i = number of monthly OPLIFTs conducted
in the Atlantic Fleet for observation i
^3i ~ monthly OPLIFT tonnage moved in the
Pacific Fleet for observation i
X4i = number of monthly OPLIFTs conducted in
the Pacific Fleet for observation i
The value of the regression coefficients (bQ, b]^,
b2/ b3 and b4) were obtained through the use of Minitab.
The computed values of the regression coefficients are:
bo = -136,507, bi = 107, b2 = 12,775, b3 = 130,
b4 = 5,256
The multiple regression equation can therefore be expressed
as follows:
Yl = -136,507 + 107Xii + 12,775X2i + 130X3^ + 5,256X4^
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The Y intercept (bo, computed as -136,507),
represents the constant used in the model. The slope of
monthly OPLIFT tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet (b^,
computed as 107) can be interpreted to mean that for a month
with a given number of OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets and a given amount of tonnage moved in the
Pacific Fleet, total monthly OPLIFT cost savings will
increase by 107 dollars for every one ton increase in OPLIFT
tonnage moved. The slope of the number of monthly OPLIFTs
conducted in the Atlantic Fleet (b2, computed as 12,775) can
be interpreted to mean that for a month with a given
quantity of tonnage moved in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets
and a given number of OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific
Fleet, total monthly OPLIFT cost savings will increase by
12,775 dollars for each additional OPLIFT conducted. The
slope of monthly tonnage moved in the Pacific Fleet (b3
,
computed as 13 0) can be interpreted to mean that for a month
with a given number of OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets and a given amount of OPLIFT tonnage moved in
the Atlantic Fleet, total monthly OPLIFT cost savings will
increase by 130 dollars for each one ton increase in OPLIFT
tonnage moved. Lastly, the slope of the number of monthly
OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific Fleet (b4, computed at
5,256) can be interpreted to mean that for a given amount of
tonnage moved in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and a given
number of OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic Fleet, total
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monthly OPLIFT cost savings will increase by 5,256 dollars
for each additional OPLIFT conducted.
B. ANALYZING THE MODEL
1. Multicollinearitv
Multicollinearity is the term applied to the
condition of strong correlations or interrelationships
between the explanatory variables. When this condition
exists it is difficult to isolate the effects individual
explanatory variables have upon the response variable. In
such instances, highly unstable regression coefficients can
result for the correlated variables. [Ref. 14 :p. 414]
One method for measuring col linearity uses the
variance inflationary factor (VIF) for each explanatory







where Rj represents the coefficient of multiple
determination of explanatory variable Xj^j with all the other
variables. [Ref. 15:p. 694]
Figure 5.1 represent partial Minitab output for the
multiple linear regression model in which total monthly
OPLIFT cost savings (Totsav) is predicted from monthly
Atlantic Fleet OPLIFT tonnage moved (Lantons) , the number of
monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic Fleet (Lanlifts)
,
monthly Pacific Fleet OPLIFT tonnage moved (Pactons) and the
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The Regression Equation is
Totsav = -136,507 + 107 Lantons + 12,775 Lanlifts
+ 130 Pactons + 5,256 Paclifts
Standard
Predictor Coefficient Deviation T-Ratio VIF
Constant -136,507 56,530 -2.41
Lantons 107.25 29.01 3.70 2.2
Lanlifts 12,775 12,780 1.00 2.3
Pactons 129.55 10.76 12.04 1.7
Paclifts 5,256 7,388 0.72 1.8
Standard Deviation about the Regression Line(S) = 215,63 5
Multiple Correlation Determination (r^) = 85.7%
r^ (adjusted) =84.67
Figure 5.1 Partial Minitab Multiple Linear Regression
Output for the Total Monthly OPLIFT Cost
Savings Data in Appendix G.
number of monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific Fleet
(Paclifts). The VIF values in Figure 5.1 are all relatively
small, ranging from a high of 2.3 to a low of 1.7. If VIF
is greater than 10, there is too much correlation between
variable xa and the other explanatory variables [Ref. 15: p.
694]. Based on this criterion, there is little evidence of
multicollinearity among the set of explanatory variables.
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2. Measuring Association in the Regression Model
Once a multiple regression model has been developed,
the coefficient of multiple determination (r^) can be
computed to determine the proportion of variation that is
explained by the set of explanatory variables selected.
Referring back to Figure 5.1, the coefficient of multiple
determination, computed as 85.7 percent, can be interpreted
to mean that 85.7 percent of the variation in total monthly
OPLIFT cost savings can be explained by the variation in the
monthly OPLIFT tonnage moved in the Atlantic and Pacific
Fleets and the variation in the number of monthly OPLIFTs
conducted in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The adjusted
r^ reflects both the number of explanatory variables in the
model and the sample size. Thus, 84.6 percent of the
variation in total monthly OPLIFT cost savings can be
explained by the multiple linear regression model adjusted
for number of predictors and sample size. [Ref. 15: p. 660]
In order to study the relationships among the
variables it is useful to examine the correlation between
each pair of variables included in the model. Such a
correlation "matrix," obtained from Minitab, is displayed in
Figure 5.2.
From Figure 5.2, it can be observed that the
correlation between the amount of monthly OPLIFT tonnage
moved in the Pacific Fleet and total monthly OPLIFT cost





Pactons 0.856 -0.073 0.160
Paclifts 0.563 -0.121 0.183
Pactons
0.640
Figure 5.2 Minitab Correlation Output for the Total
Monthly OPLIFT Cost Savings Data in
Appendix G.
between the two variables. It can also be observed that the
correlation between the amount of monthly OPLIFT tonnage
moved in the Atlantic Fleet and the number of monthly
OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic Fleet is .698, indicating
a moderately strong positive association between the
variables. The correlation between tonnage moved and
OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific Fleet is .64, also
indicating a moderately strong positive association.
Moderate positive correlation exists between total monthly
OPLIFT cost savings and the number of monthly OPLIFTs
conducted in the Atlantic Fleet and monthly OPLIFT costs
savings and the number of OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific
Fleet, The correlation between monthly OPLIFT cost savings
and monthly tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet is .281,
indicating a weak positive correlation between the
variables. There is virtually no correlation between the
explanatory variables monthly tonnage moved in the Pacific
Fleet and monthly tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet,
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monthly tonnage moved in the Pacific Fleet and the number of
monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic Fleet, monthly
tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet and the number of
monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific Fleet and the
number of monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic and the
Pacific Fleets.
3. Stepwise Regression
A widely used criterion of model building is
"parsimony" or the development of a regression model that
includes the least number of explanatory variables that
permits an adequate interpretation of the dependent
variables of interest. Regression models with fewer
explanatory variables are by nature easier to interpret.
[Ref. 15:p. 702]
A search procedure called stepwise regression is
widely used to determine variables that might be deleted
from the complete model. In developing a multiple linear
regression model, the goal is to use only those explanatory
variables that are useful in predicting the value of the
dependent variable. If an explanatory variable does not aid
in making the prediction, then it should be deleted and a
model with fewer explanatory variables utilized in its
place. One method for determining the contribution of an
explanatory variable is the "partial F-test criterion." It
involves determining the contribution made by each
explanatory variable after all other explanatory variables
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have been included in a model. The new explanatory variable
would only be included if it improved the multiple linear
regression model significantly. [Ref. 15:pp. 661-668]
Figure 5.3 represents Minitab output for a stepwise
regression of the total monthly OPLIFT cost savings data in
Appendix G. The new multiple linear regression equation for
the model becomes:
Yi = -95,061 + 127xii + 137X3i
Minitab has determined that X2 (the number of monthly
OPLIFTs conducted in the Atlantic Fleet) and X4 (the number
of monthly OPLIFTs conducted in the Pacific Fleet) do not
contribute significantly to the model and they have
therefore been deleted.









Figure 5.3 Minitab Stepwise Regression Output for the












Once the explanatory variables to be included in the
model have been selected, a graphical approach known as
residual analysis can be undertaken to evaluate the aptness
of the fitted multiple linear regression model. The
residuals or error values are defined as the difference
between the observed (y^) and predicted (y^) value of the
dependent variable for given values of x^. The aptness of
the fitted regression model can be evaluated by plotting the
residuals on the vertical axis against the corresponding x^
values of the independent variable on the horizontal axis.
If the fitted model is appropriate for the data, there will
be no apparent pattern in the plot of the residuals versus
Xj^. If, however, the fitted model is not appropriate, there
will be a relationship between the x^ values and the
residuals. [Ref. 15:p. 613]
When examining the multiple linear regression model
for predicting total monthly OPLIFT cost savings, the
following residual plots are of interest:
1. Standardized residuals versus yj^ (YHAT)
2. Standardized residuals versus x^^ (LANTONS)
3. Standardized residuals versus X3i (PACTONS)
The first residual plot examines the pattern of residuals
for the predicted values of Y. If the standardized
residuals appear to vary for different levels of the
predicted Y value, it provides evidence of a potential
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curvilinear effect in at least one explanatory variable and
the need to transform the dependent variable. The second
and third residual plots concern the explanatory variables.
Patterns in the plot of the standardized residuals versus an
explanatory variable can also indicate the existence of a
curvilinear effect and lead to the possible transformation
of that explanatory variable. [Ref. 14 :p. 285]
The residual plots for the multiple linear
regression model for predicting total monthly OPLIFT cost
savings, obtained from Minitab, are displayed in Figures 5.4
through 5.6. There appears to be very little pattern in the
relationship between the standardized residuals and either
the predicted value of yj^, the value of x^i or the value of
X3i. It can therefore be concluded that the multiple
regression model is appropriate for predicting total monthly
OPLIFT cost savings.
5. Influence Measures
Regression diagnostics deals with both the
evaluation of the aptness of a fitted model and the
potential effect or "influence" of each particular point on
that model. Three methods that measure the influence of
particular data points are the hat matrix elements,
Studentized deleted residuals and Cook's distance statistic.
The hat matrix elements reflect the influence of each x^ on
the fitted regression model. The Studentized deleted
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Figure 5.4 Minitab Residual Plot for Standardized
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Figure 5.6 Minitab Residual Plot for Standardized
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value of Yi and predicted value y^ obtained from a model
that includes all observations other than i. The
utilization of the hat matrix elements and Studentized
deleted residuals in the search for potential troublesome
data points, however, is complementary, with neither
criterion being sufficient by itself. To decide whether a
point flagged by either the hat matrix elements or
Studentized deleted residuals is unduly affecting the model.
Cook's distance statistic is used. [Ref. 15:pp. 697-699]
The observations cited as unusual by Minitab, after
performing the three measures of influence, are displayed in
Figure 5.7.
Since the unusual observations displayed in Figure
5.7 were determined to have exerted undue influence on the
fitted model, it is not unreasonable to explore alternative
models with those five observations deleted. Figure 5.8
represents partial Minitab output for such a model. The
model includes the two explanatory variables of monthly
OPLIFT tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet and monthly
OPLIFT tonnage moved in the Pacific Fleet. From Figure 5.8
it is observed that the VIF values are 1.0, indicating no
evidence of multicollinearity. The r^ is 89.4% and the r^
(adjusted) is 88.9%, indicating that the two explanatory
variables explain a significant amount of the variation in
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The Regression Equation is:
Totsav =
-62,916 + 126 Lantons + 113 Pactons
Predictor Coefficient Standard Deviation T-Ratio VIF
Constant - 62,916 27,181 - 2.31
Lantons - 126.14 10.23 12.33 1.0
Pactons 113.201 6.805 16.63 1.0
Standard Deviation about the Regression Line(S) = 112,107
Multiple Correlation of Determination (r^) = 89.4%
r^ (adjusted) = 88.9%
Figure 5.8 Partial Minitab Output for the Total
Monthly OPLIFT Cost Savings Data in
Appendix G with Five Observations Deleted
Yi = -62,916 + 126xii + 113x3^
From the model we can conclude that for each additional ton
of OPLIFT cargo moved in the Atlantic Fleet, total monthly
OPLIFT cost savings increases by 126 dollars holding
constant the effect of monthly tonnage moved in the Pacific
Fleet. Furthermore, for each additional ton of OPLIFT cargo
moved monthly in the Pacific Fleet, total monthly OPLIFT
cost savings increases by 113 dollars, holding constant the
effect of monthly tonnage moved in the Atlantic Fleet.
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6. Disadvantage in Using the Model
The regression model developed requires monthly
forecasts of OPLIFT tonnage moved by both fleets. This
forecast is required to determine the independent, or
explanatory, variables to be used in the total monthly cost
savings model. Erroneous tonnage forecasts will result in a
faulty cost savings prediction. To protect against this a
quantitative predictive model is required. The development
of such a model to predict the monthly quantity of OPLIFT
tonnage moved is beyond the scope of this study. Such a
model is required, however, to facilitate accurate monthly
cost savings predictions.
C. SUMMARY
In this chapter a multiple linear regression model was
developed through the use of Minitab to predict total
monthly OPLIFT cost savings. In arriving at the model,
association and multicollinearity were measured, stepwise
regression was performed, and residual and influence
analysis were accomplished. A fitted multiple linear
regression model expressed as follows was developed:
yi = -62,916 + 126xii + 113X3i
where
:
^li ~ monthly OPLIFT tonnage moved in the
Atlantic fleet for observation i
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X3i = monthly OPLIFT tonnage moved in the
Pacific Fleet for observation i
Chapter VI will present the principal findings,
recommendations and conclusions of this study.
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VI. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this study were fivefold:
1. Determine whether the Navy is currently placing
enough emphasis on the use of OPLIFT as a cost
avoidance measure;
2. Review OPLIFT implementation at the fleet level to
ascertain if viable programs are in place;
3. Examine OPLIFT relative to frequency of use, tonnage
moved, cost savings achieved, types of cargo moved,
categories of ship moving the cargo and traffic routes




Review the current transportation cost savings
reporting system to determine whether it provides a
meaningful picture of program performance; and
5. Develop a model that can predict total monthly OPLIFT
cost savings.
The principal findings and conclusions are derived from a
review of existing instructions, point papers, cost savings
data, tonnage data and correspondence and through personal
and telephone interviews.
1. Top Management Emphasis
The OPLIFT program, in terms of cost savings, has
waxed and waned considerably since its implementation. The
Program has thrived only when high level attention (CNO,
NAVSUPSYSCOM and Fleet CINC) has been placed on it. In FY
1976, a time of fiscal "belt tightening," the Program
received a great deal of attention at the CNO level and
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proved an effective cost avoidance tool. From FYs 1978 to
1982, a period during which little high level attention was
given to OPLIFT, the real growth in OPLIFT cost savings
declined. In FYs 1983 and 1984, when fiscal constraints
once again dictated a high level of CNO, NAVSUPSYSCOM and
Fleet CINC interest in OPLIFT, the cost savings attributed
to the Program increased significantly. From FY 1985
through May of FY 1987 OPLIFT cost savings declined
dramatically. During this same period there was little top
management attention focused on OPLIFT. The performance of
OPLIFT appears to be closely related to the level of top
management interest focused on the program, which in turn is
closely tied to the financial "health" of the SWT account.
The OPLIFT program appears to achieve the maximum cost
savings only when under the close scrutiny of top
management. At other times the Program does achieve cost
savings, but not nearly at the level to which it has shown
itself to be capable.
2. Implementation at the Fleet Level
The OPLIFT program in the Pacific Fleet has
consistently been utilized more than that of the Atlantic
Fleet. In the Pacific Fleet OPLIFT tasks, assignments and
responsibilities are clearly defined and specified at a
number of different operating levels. Superior
organization, administration and coordination appear to be a
major contributing factor to the greater utilization
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demonstrated by the Pacific Fleet. Though OPLIFT seems to
have functioned at a satisfactory level in the Atlantic
Fleet, the Program implemented in the Pacific Fleet appears
to function more effectively. Inconsistencies relative to
OPLIFT policy exist in both fleets, particularly in regards
to priority of space allocation, cargo eligibility and
reporting of OPLIFT "space available" by individual ships.
The lack of a clearly defined OPLIFT policy at the CNO level
has led to the inconsistencies existing in the program.
3 . Trends and Patterns
Differing OPLIFT utilization patterns have emerged
in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. General cargo has
emerged as the primary category of OPLIFT cargo moved in the
Atlantic Fleet. In the Pacific Fleet, general cargo ranks
third behind ordnance and aircraft. The primary
transporters of OPLIFT cargo in the Atlantic Fleet are CLSF
ships. Amphibious Force ships account for the largest
percentage of OPLIFT tonnage moved in the Pacific Fleet.
The types of cargo moved by the different ship categories
also differs by fleet. In the Atlantic Fleet CLSF ships are
used primarily to transport general cargo while boats
accounted for the largest percentage of the tonnage moved by
amphibious ships. The pattern is different in the Pacific
Fleet where CLSF ships are used mainly to move ordnance and
amphibious ships are utilized primarily to move aircraft.
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Combatants, Tenders, Aircraft Carriers and "Other" ship
types have had little impact on OPLIFT in either fleet.
Patterns have also developed with regard to the
traffic routes utilized for OPLIFT. Of the 77 different
traffic routes utilized to move OPLIFT cargo, 13 (17
percent) have accounted for almost 80 percent of the OPLIFT
tonnage moved. In the Atlantic Fleet, 25 different traffic
routes were used, with five routes (20 percent) accounting
for 86 percent of the tonnage moved. In the Pacific Fleet,
52 different routes were used, with eight traffic routes (15
percent) accounting for 75 percent of the tonnage. This
appears to show that the movement of OPLIFT cargo between
traffic areas is highly concentrated and strongly tied to
the level of Naval presence in those areas.
4. Performance Goals
OPLIFT cost savings are calculated monthly by
NAVMTO, the Program Manager. NAVMTO only reports the cost
savings, it does not compare or measure the cost savings
against any standard nor does it advise other activities of
the Program ' s trends . Monthly cost savings are taken at
their face value, with no performance goal or standard
against which they are measured. This makes it difficult to
fully comprehend the significance of monthly and annual
changes in cost savings over time. Does a decrease in cost
savings from one year to the next really mean the Program is
in a downturn, or are there other factors to be considered?
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There is currently no system in effect whereby the cost
savings performance of OPLIFT can be accurately measured.
Until some form of annual performance standard is
established against which actual cost savings can be
compared, it will be difficult to accurately gauge the
performance of OPLIFT as a cost avoidance tool.
There is also no established performance measure and
goal to gauge efficient utilization of ship OPLIFT movement
capacity. Such a performance measure and goal would
facilitate the determination of allowable levels of movement
capacity utilization efficiency, i.e., is cargo being moved
by OPLIFT when the demand and capacity for movement exists.
The collection of the necessary cost savings and
tonnage data, the reporting and monitoring of OPLIFT
performance measures and the establishment of OPLIFT
performance goals may require more time and manpower
resources than the current "collateral duty" nature of the
OPLIFT program allows. Without such data, measures and
goals, however, it is difficult to determine OPLIFT
performance. NAVSUPSYSCOM, NAVMTO, the Fleet CINCS and
Fleet OPLIFT Coordinators must, therefore, weigh the costs
of providing additional manpower to manage and monitor
OPLIFT against the potential for millions of dollars in cost
savings foregone due to ineffective Program management and
control.
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5. Cost Savings Prediction Model
A model that can predict total monthly OPLIFT cost
savings could be a useful management tool for program
planning and control. Cost savings, however, is dependent
on the number of tons moved by OPLIFT. To facilitate
accurate cost savings forecasts, a means of. accurately
forecasting tonnage shipped by OPLIFT must also be
developed.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the data presented, it is the opinion of this
writer that the Navy's Surface OPLIFT program is a very
valuable and viable program. The Program has achieved over
$28 million in reported cost savings since October 1982.
The results of the research conducted, however, indicate
that the Program has not performed up to its full potential.
This is more a result of lack of concern by management than
mismanagement. With proper top management emphasis, the
establishment of annual performance goals and the
development of predictive models to forecast tonnage and
cost savings the Program can achieve even greater cost
savings.
1. Top Level Management Emphasis
It is recommended that an OPNAV instruction
delineating the Navy's policy on all aspects of OPLIFT be
issued for the purpose of erradicating the policy
inconsistencies that now exist. It is also recommended that
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CNO, NAVSUPSYSCOM, the Fleet CINCS and the Fleet OPLIFT
Coordinators place greater emphasis on the use of OPLIFT and
that NAVMTO, as Program Manager, play a more active role in
monitoring the performance of OPLIFT and reporting on
program trends. Furthermore, it is recommended that Fleet
OPLIFT Coordinators and shipping activities pursue the use
of OPLIFT as an alternative to commercial ocean
transportation more aggressively. Though there are some
circumstances that partially explain the downturn in OPLIFT
utilization and cost savings, the fact remains that because
of decreased high level scrutiny and concern, OPLIFT is not
being pursued to the degree that it was in FYs 1983 and
1984. Lastly, it is recommended that NAVSUPSYSCOM, NAVMTO,
the Fleet CINCS and the Fleet OPLIFT Coordinators review the
personnel resources they have allocated to OPLIFT. The
potential for millions of dollars in OPLIFT cost savings
lost due to ineffective Program management and control,
resulting from insufficient OPLIFT manning, must be weighed
against the costs of providing more people to manage and
monitor OPLIFT.
2 . Establishment of an Annual Performance Goal
It is recommended that an annual OPLIFT cost savings
goal be established by NAVSUPSYSCOM so that a true picture
of program performance can be determined. One possible goal
is an annual cost savings equivalent to a specified
percentage of that fiscal year's SWT expenditure on MSC
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cargo. Another is an annual cost savings equal to a
specified percentage of that fiscal year's total SWT
expenditure. The determination of the specific performance
measures to be applied are beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, some form of goal or measure must be established.
Only then can the significance of the reported cost savings
be fully understood.
It is also recommended that a measure of OPLIFT
movement capacity utilization efficiency and a corresponding
performance goal be established by NAVSUPSYSCOM. OPLIFT
movement capacity utilization efficiency can be measured by
examining the utilization of available OPLIFT space, data
that can be provided to the Fleet OPLIFT Coordinators by the
individual ships (this information is currently provided in
the Pacific Fleet and SIXTH Fleet) . By comparing OPLIFT
tonnage moved with total "space available" for OPLIFT, a
level of efficiency can be determined. Performance can then
be determined by comparing the annual level of efficiency
with the annual efficiency goal. The determination of the
specific efficiency goal to be applied is beyond the scope
of this thesis.
3 . OPLIFT Implementation in the Atlantic Fleet
It is recommended that COMNAVSURFLANT , as Atlantic
Fleet OPLIFT coordinator, issue a formal instruction that
clearly outlines policy and defines the specific
responsibilities, tasks and reporting requirements for the
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conduct of OPLIFT in the Atlantic. At this point in time
the Atlantic Fleet appears to lack the necessary written
guidance to ensure the effective implementation and
utilization of OPLIFT at all levels of operation.
It is also recommended that the Atlantic Fleet
require deploying ships to provide to COMNAVSURFLANT an
OPLIFT "space available" report, similar to that required in
the Pacific Fleet.
4. Predictive Models
It is recommended that NAVMTO develop a predictive
model to forecast the number of OPLIFT tons to be moved by
the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet on a monthly basis. Since
cost savings are a function of tonnage moved, a model that
can accurately predict monthly tonnage moved will facilitate
the accuracy of the cost savings model developed in this
study. Such models can be of value to NAVMTO in its role as
Program Manager. When used in conjunction with an annual
cost savings goal, the models can help provide timely data
on OPLIFT performance status, i.e., is the Program on track
to meet the goal and if not, how much of an increase in
tonnage moved and cost savings must occur in order to get
back on track.
The above recommendations have been made with the
intent to upgrade and improve the Navy's Surface OPLIFT
program. In view of the millions of dollars spent annually
by the Department of the Navy for the commercial ocean
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transportation of cargo, and the growing fiscal uncertainty,
continued emphasis should be placed on OPLIFT in achieving
maximum cost savings. It is imperative that Navy "defense"
dollars be spent only where absolutely needed and that the
best value be obtained for that "defense" dollar. Prudent
use of OPLIFT is a means to this end.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF OPPORTUNE LIFT BY CARGO CATEGORY
TABLE A.l
FISCAL YEAR 1983 CARGO SUMMARY
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Cargo
Category M»T. C.S. M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S.
Aircraft 1,387 155,469 9,997 913,377 11,384 1,068,846
Ordnance 2,117 398,536 7,360 1,084,418 9,477 1,482,954
Boats 8,036 1,035,392 2,827 479,682 10,863 1,515,674
General
Cargo 10,388 777,088 1,200 50,102 11,588 827,190
Vehicles 3,016 222,354 3,268 519,242 6,284 741,596
Other 1.863 149.327 495 151.291 2.358 300.618
TOTAL 26,807 2,738,166 25,147 3,198,112 51,954 5,936,278
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)





FISCAL YEAR 1984 CARGO SUMMARY
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Cargo
Category M.T. C.S. M.T, C,S. M.T. C.S»
Aircraft 1,783 234,998 16,986 2,044,158 18,769 2,280,156
Ordnance 1,668 315,710 12,425 2,645,290 14,093 2,960,000
Boats 2,623 299,000 19,151 3,479,231 21,774 3,778,231
General
Cargo 14,503 1,675,445 6,688 596,481 21,191 2,271,926
Vehicles 1,698 168,792 1,010 141,517 2,708 310,309
Other 383 31.711 1.743 149.047 2.126 180.758
TOTAL 22,658 2,726,656 58,003 9,055,724 80,661 11,782,380
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)





FISCAL YEAR 1985 CARGO SUMMARY
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Cargo
Category M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S.
Aircraft 503 44,113 4,385 372,601 4,888 416,714
Ordnance 1,376 185,419 9,822 1,235,950 11,198 1,421,369
Boats 2,000 121,166 5,305 310,106 7,305 431,272
General
Cargo 9,942 732,424 22,940 1,585,444 32,882 2,317,868
Vehicles 738 64,275 2,736 219,583 3,474 283,858
Other 2.763 146.583 3.539 242.343 6.302 388.926
TOTAL 17,322 1,293,980 48,727 3,966,027 66,049 5,260,007
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings (S)




















Aircraft 63 4,948 4,470 618,733 4,533 623,681
Ordnance 919 87,345 23,315 3 ,067,976 24,234 3 ,155,321
Boats 1,084 40,968 1,495 102,986 2,579 143,954
General
Cargo 2,185 160,921 1,764 126,879 3,949 287,800
Vehicles 207 21,279 403 37,904 610 59,183
Other 322 26.992 1.277
-
101.606 1.599 128.598
TOTAL 4,780 342,453 32,724 4 ,056,084 37,504 4 ,398,537
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)





















10,504 848,502 10,504 848,502
3,182 274,697 3,547 296,816
450 22,772 450 22,772
1,439 114,163 1,532 118,521
1,088 45,855 1,088 45,855
327 20.897 327 20.897
16,990 1,326,886 17,448 1,353,363
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)




SUMMARY OF OPLIFT BY SHIP CATEGORY
TABLE B.l
OPPORTUNE LIFT BY SHIP CATEGORY,
FISCAL YEAR 1983
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Ship
Category M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S.
CLSF 13,949 1,377,807 10,508 1,359,051 24,457 2,736,858
Amphibi-
ous 12,704 1,345,879 13,737 1,756,193 26,441 3,102,072
Comba-
tant 81 7,203 11 695 92 7,898
Tender 6 321 891 82,173 897 82,494
Aircraft
Carrier
Other _ 67 6.956 67 6.956
TOTAL 26,807 2,738,166 25,147 3,198,112 51,954 5,936,278
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)




OPPORTUNE LIFT BY SHIP CATEGORY,
FISCAL YEAR 1984
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Ship
Category M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S.
CLSF 13,299 1,782,076 15,188 2,851,503 28,487 4,633,579
Amphibi-
ous 8,472 821,171 40,667 5,923,307 49,139 6,744,478
Comba-
tant 250 37,074 316 44,068 566 81,142
Tender 601 80,954 1,249 130,093 1,850 211,047
Aircraft
Carrier 562 105,487 562 105,487
Other 36 5.381 21 1.266 57 6.647
TOTAL 22,658 2,726,656 58,003 9,055,724 80,661 11,782,380
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)




OPPORTUNE LIFT BY SHIP CATEGORY,
FISCAL YEAR 1985
Atlantic Coast Pacific Coast Fleet Total
Ship
Cateaorv M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S.
CTnSF 10 ,819 833,501 15,543 1 ,578,541 26,362 2,412,042
Amphibi-
ous 5 ,593 384,624 31,514 2 ,219,455 37,107 2,604,079
Comba-
tant 45 5,775 184 11,407 229 17,182
Tender 353 30,294 353 30,294
Aircraft
Carrier 503 44,113 1,133 126,330 1,636 170,443
Other 362 25.967 362 25.967
TOTAL 17,322 1,293,980 48,727 3,966,027 66,049 5,260,007
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)




OPPORTUNE LIFT BY SHIP CATEGORY,
FISCAL YEAR 1986
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Ship
Cateaorv M.T. C. S. M.T. C.S. M,.T. C.S.
CLSF 3,010 268 ,876 26,388 3,460,181 29.,398 3,729,057
Amphibi-
ous 1,765 73 ,185 5,667 506,529 7.,432 579,714
Comba-
tant 70 5,544 70 5,544
Tender 5 392 5 392
Aircraft
Carrier 599 83,830 599 83,830
Other 453
TOTAL 4,780 342,453 32,724 4,056,084 37,504 4,398,537
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings ($)




OPPORTUNE LIFT BY SHIP CATEGORY,
FISCAL YEAR 1987 (THROUGH MAY)
Atlantic Fleet Pacific Fleet Fleet Total
Ship
Catecforv M.T. C.S. M.T. C.S. W[.T. C.S.
CT..SF 417 25,444 5,154 390,531 5, 571 415,975
Amphibi-
ous 11,802 934,319 11, 802 934,319
Comba-
tant 41 1,033 41 1,033




TOTAL 458 26,477 16,990 1,326,886 17, 448 ]L, 353, 363
Notes: M.T. = Measurement Tons
C.S. = Cost Savings




SUMMARY OF CATEGORIES OF OPPORTUNE LIFT
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Includes all ocean ports on the Atlantic
Coast of the United States. Primary
OPLIFT ports are Norfolk, Virginia;
Mayport, Florida; Newport, Rhode Island;
and Earle, New Jersey.
Includes all ocean ports of the West
Coast of Florida (excluding Key West)
,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and
Texas. Primary OPLIFT port is Pensacola,
Florida.
Includes all ocean ports of California.
Primary OPLIFT ports are Concord, San
Francisco, Alameda, Oakland, Long Beach,
San Diego and Coronado.
Includes all ocean ports of Oregon and
Washington. Primary OPLIFT ports were
Bremerton and Seattle, Washington.
Includes all ocean ports of the Republic
of Panama on the Atlantic Coast.
Includes all ocean ports of Bermuda.
Virgin Islands, Leeward Islands, Windward
Islands, Tobago, Trinidad, and the ocean
ports of Venezuela, British Guiana,
Surinam and French Guiana.
Includes all ocean ports of Puerto Rico.
Primary OPLIFT port is Roosevelt Roads.
Includes all ocean ports on the east
coast of Mexico and Central America,
Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, northern coast
ports of Columbia, Bahamas, Turk and





Includes the ports of Guantanamo,
Santiago, Puerto Manati, and Nuevita,
Cuba. Primary OPLIFT port is Guantanamo,
Includes all ocean ports of West Germany,
Netherlands, Belgium, Atlantic Ocean
ports of France and of Spain north of
northern Portuguese border; all ports of
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland.
Includes all ocean or English Channel
ports of Great Britain and Ireland.
West
Mediterranean Includes all ocean ports of Portugal and
Spain south of the northern Portuguese
border, Mediterranean ports of Spain and
France, Canary Islands, French and
Spanish Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
Baleric Islands, Corsica, Sardinia,
Malta, Sicily, and the west coast ports
of Italy. Primary OPLIFT ports are Rota,
Spain, Naples, Italy, Augusta Bay,






Includes all Mediterranean, Adriatic,
Ionian, Aegean, Libya, Egypt, Israel,
Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece,
Albania and Yugoslavia ports and all east
coast ports of Italy; includes Istanbul.
Primary OPLIFT port is Souda Bay, Crete.
Includes all ocean ports on west coast of
Africa from the northern boundary of Rio
de Oro to the southern boundary of Angola
including the Cape Verde Islands,
Ascension Island, and St. Helena.
Includes all Red Sea ports; all ports in
the Gulf of Aden to Cape Guardafui, all
Gulf of Oman ports to the West Pakistan-
Iran border and all Arabian Gulf ports.
Primary OPLIFT port is Bahrain.
Includes all ocean ports of Hawaiian
Islands (excluding Johnston and Midway














Includes all ocean ports of the Marianas
Islands. Primary OPLIFT port is Agana,
Guam.
Includes all ocean ports of Taiwan and
including Hong Kong. Primary OPLIFT port
is Hong Kong.
Includes all ocean ports of the
Philippine Islands. Primary OPLIFT port
is Subic Bay.
Includes all ocean ports on the eastern
coast of South America from, but
excluding, French Guiana to Cape Horn.
Includes all ocean ports of Sumatra,
Java, Timor, Celebes, Borneo, and the
Malay States but excluding New Guinea,
Palau, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand,
and Cambodia. Primary OPLIFT port is
Singapore.
Includes all ocean ports of Ryukyu
Islands. Primary OPLIFT area is Okinawa.
Includes all ocean ports of South Korea.
Includes all ocean ports of Japan.
Primary OPLIFT ports are Iwakuni, Sasebo,
Yokosuka, and Atsugi.
Includes all islands in the Indian Ocean.
Primary OPLIFT port is Diego Garcia.
Source: Appendix B to OPNAVINST 4600. 17C
105
APPENDIX E
SUMMARY OF OPPORTUNE LIFT BY TRAFFIC ROUTES
TABLE E.l































































































































































Traffic Route Tons Savings
Ryukyu Islands-Japan 796 57,826
Taiwan-Philippines 234 16,392
Other Southeast Asia-California Coast 88 14 .260
TOTAL 80,661 11,782,380

































































































































































































































































SUMMARY OF TRAFFIC ROUTES UTILIZED










































































































































































SUMMARY OF TRAFFIC AREAS FROM WHICH CARGO EMBARKED,














































SUMMARY OF TRAFFIC AREAS FROM WHICH CARGO DISEMBARKED,






























































SUMMARY OF THE 13 MAJOR TRAFFIC ROUTES UTILIZED FOR
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TOTAL MONTHLY COST SAVINGS DATA




Observa-- FY/ Cost # #
tion Month Savinas Tonnaae Lifts Tonnacre Lifts
1 FY 83 Oct $ 82,004 1,140 2
2 Nov 56 ,144 776 4
3 Dec 1 ,309 ,192 1,717 6 8,714 5
4 Jan 278 ,772 2,555 8 332 1
5 Feb 1 ,392 ,913 2,597 9 7,824 10
6 Mar 18 ,849 126 5 259 2
7 Apr 56 ,103 1,108 5
8 May 697 ,403 2,394 10 2,873 3
9 Jun 190 ,283 1,292 6 1,238 2
10 Jul 876 ,904 5,351 3 1,911 3
11 Aug 495 ,105 4,132 13 698 3
12 Sep 482 ,606 3,619 7 1,298 5
13 FY 84 Oct 1 ,978 ,230 961 9 10,926 16
14 Nov 794 ,173 844 8 5,058 15
15 Dec 557 ,820 2,343 6 1,564 11
16 Jan 672 ,117 103 3 5,519 8
17 Feb 1 ,023 ,048 1,462 6 6,049 12
18 Mar 2 ,693 ,518 2,161 10 14,055 9
19 Apr 929;,811 7,837 14
20 May 154,,225 753 4 1,013 4
21 Jun 675,,239 3,101 7 2,181 3
22 Jul 360,,042 582 6 3,260 9
23 Aug 1 ,372, 747 817 6 6,228 22
24 Sep 571, 410 1,694 3 2,150 7
25 FY 85 Oct 648, 232 1,858 9 6,177 9
26 Nov 191, 479 767 5 2,818 6
27 Dec 1 ,491, 898 757 3 16,074 15
28 Jan 136, 464 195 4 2,686 6
29 Feb 401, 421 3,551 7 1,160 7
30 Mar 110, 183 816 6 379 9
31 Apr 599, 514 1,775 8 4,597 22
32 May 202, 883 879 5 2,595 6
33 Jun 162, 923 1,566 9 1,088 8
34 Jul 377, 824 2,346 2 3,626 5
35 Aug 722, 546 2,133 5 5,617 12
131

















37 FY 86 Oct 740,477 315 4 8,615 12
38 Nov 421,682 76 3 3,619 9
39 Dec 1,723,333 133 1 8,837 16
40 Jan 44,359 5 1 286 3
41 Feb 97,328 1 1 693 3
42 Mar 82,852 1 ,073 3 70 1
43 Apr 356,269 1 ,678 4 2,432 4
44 May 169,170 35 1 2,173 11
45 Jun 79,383 1 ,373 3
46 Jul 315,252 91 1 2,491 12
47 Aug 3,259 77 2
48 Sep 365,173 3,431 3
49 FY 87 Oct 102,505 1,455 5
50 Nov 73,733 418 3 765 4
51 Dec 12,255 97 1
52 Jan 108,069 2,021 4
53 Feb 372,431 4,735 4
54 Mar 242,176 2,738 1
55 Apr 1,002 40 1
56 May 441,192 5,179 7
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c.l The Navy's Surface
Opportune Lift program.

